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COPYRIGHT LAW-WHO GETS THE PICTURE?-Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No.
81-1687).*
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined the scope of copy-
right protection afforded audiovisual material broadcast on public air-
ways. The plaintiffs, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Pro-
ductions, Inc., produced and owned the copyrights to thirty-two publicly
broadcast motion pictures. The case arose when the defendant recorded
these movies for private use on a Sony "Betamax" brand home videotape
recorder (VTR). The plaintiffs sued this defendant for direct copyright
infringement. They also sued the manufacturer, 2 distributor, 3 advertiser, 4
and retail sellers of the Betamax VTR for contributory and vicarious in-
fringement for their involvement in producing, distributing, promoting,
and selling the instrumentality used to achieve the direct infringement. 5
The Ninth Circuit, reversing the trial court, 6 held that the home user
had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights and was not protected by the fair
* A slightly different version of this piece will be entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Com-
petition at the University of Washington and in the national competition. The Burkan competition is
sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers.
1. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No.
81-1687).
2. Sony Corporation.
3. Sony Corporation of America.
4. Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.
5. Plaintiffs also alleged that this latter group had directly infringed their copyrights. The district
court rejected this claim and was affirmed on this point. 659 F.2d at 976.
6. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). (Hereinafter references to the district court opinion will give
only the opinion citation and not the subsequent history.) The district court held that the plaintiffs'
copyrights were not infringed by a home user's recording of the copyrighted materials where those
materials were broadcast over public airways and the recording was made for the viewer's private and
noncommercial use. Id. at 456. It also held that a retailer of the recorder did not infringe upon the
copyrights where its use of the copyrighted materials was merely to show the technical proficiency of
the recording device and not for competitive or commercial purposes. The purely demonstrative use
of the materials by the retailer, like the purely private noncommercial use by the home user, was held
to be a "fair" and noninfringing use. Id. at 457. The district court also refused to extend vicarious or
contributory liability to the manufacturer, distributor, advertiser, or retailers of the Betamax. The
court found that those defendants could not have known of the potentially infringing nature of the
home recording of the copyrighted materials prior to this law suit. Id. at 459. It further reasoned that
their conduct neither induced nor materially contributed to particular recordings of plaintiffs' materi-
als, that they had no control to prevent or supervise such recordings, and that the Betamax was a
staple item of commerce which had substantial uses other than to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights. Id. at
460-61.
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use privilege. 7 The court further held that the Betamax manufacturer, dis-
tributor, and advertiser were liable for contributory infringement because
they knew that home VTR's would be used to reproduce copyrighted
materials and because they were sufficiently engaged in that infringement
to be held accountable. 8 The court left the district court with the task of
fashioning appropriate remedies.
This Note begins by reviewing the doctrines of fair use and contribu-
tory infringement. It then analyzes the Sony decision, arguing that the
Ninth Circuit should have applied the equitable doctrine of fair use more
liberally. Further, it argues that the court should have accepted the analo-
gous "staple item of commerce" theory from patent law as a defense to
the contributory infringement claim. Eschewing rigid analysis as ill-
suited to defining rights and liabilities arising from new VTR technology,
the Note advocates a pragmatic application of the Copyright Act.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The technological advancement of the home video recorder presented
the Ninth Circuit with a case of first impression. Nevertheless, the funda-
mental principles of copyright law are the same whether the technology is
old or new. 9 The basic purpose of copyrights is found in the United States
Constitution: "To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 10 This clause encourages
individual effort by enhancing personal gain. t' The artistic and scientific
fruits of this individual effort benefit the public as well. The Copyright
Act12 accomplishes its purpose by giving copyright holders limited statu-
tory monopolies over some, but not all, uses of their copyrighted
works.' 3 Thus, the scope of the statutory monopoly is limited, as is the
duration of the copyright. 14
7. See generally part IA infra (discussing fair use).
8. 659 F.2d at 975-76. The court agreed with the trial court that the retail store was protected by
fair use. Id. at 976.
9. Cf. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974) ("When technologi-
cal change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of
[its] basic purpose.") (footnote omitted).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954).
12. 17U.S.C.§§ 101-810(Supp.II 1978).
13. See id. § 106 (giving the copyright owner, as of the effective date of Jan. I. 1978, the exclu-
sive right to print, reprint, publish, copy, vend, perform, and display publicly the copyrighted work).
14. Generally, the duration of a copyright is limited by statute to the life of the author plus fifty
years. Id. 302(a). See 2 M. NIMMER. NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 901 (1981).
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A. Fair Use
A major issue in the Sony case was the application of the doctrine of
fair use, a judicially developed limitation on the scope of copyright pro-
tection. 15 The courts, and later Congress, 16 realized that unlimited copy-
right protection could inhibit societal progress by unduly restricting pub-
lic dissemination of artistic and scientific information. 17 They also
recognized that not every unauthorized use of copyrighted materials
posed an economic threat that would discourage further creative initia-
tive. Accordingly, they developed the doctrine of fair use as a defense. 18
This defense is available when a particular use of copyrighted material
promotes progress in science and the arts more than does enforcement of
the copyright. 19
The judicial fair use doctrine was characterized by flexibility to accom-
modate the great variety of uses presented to courts. 20 Its operation was
based entirely on equitable considerations. Congress sought to codify tle
flexible and somewhat amorphous judicial standards of fair use21 in sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.22 The Act mandates consideration
15. The concept of fair use was first introduced by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
' 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 55n.36 (1981).
16. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra.
17. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901):. "In short, we must
often . . . look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the mate-
rials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or su-
persede the objects, of the original work." Id. at 348.
18. Commentators debate whether fair use is a defense or a form of excused infringement. See
generally Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 56-58
(1981) (explaining the nature of this debate).
19. See, e.g., Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc. 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964) ("[T]he financial reward guaranteed to the copyright holder is but an incident of
[the] general objective . . . . As a result, courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement
must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the
greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry.").
A privilege is recognized in the nonowner to use the copyrighted materials in a reasonable manner
without the consent of the owner. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (quoting BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
20. The same flexibility made the doctrine difficult to define. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,
293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Its application has been termed "the most troublesome in
the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
21. H. R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32(1967).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 111978). This section provides in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be
considered shall include [the four factors quoted in text]. (emphasis added).
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of at least four factors in determining whether the use made of a work is
fair. These four factors are:
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. The nature of the copyrighted work;
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.23
Courts have given the third factor, the substantiality of the taking, spe-
cial attention. 24 The Ninth Circuit in Benny v. Loew's Inc. 25 found that a
substantial taking precluded fair use. Although affirmed by the Supreme
Court,2 6 Benny has not been widely followed. 27 Moreover, the Ninth Cir-
cuit later observed that strict application of the Benny rationale would
severely undermine the fair use defense because it would limit the defense
to a relatively small number of cases. 28 Most courts determining whether
a use is privileged evaluate all the statutory factors. 29 No one factor
should be determinative.
B. Contributory Infringement
The other major issue in Sony was contributory infringement, a concept
which is part of both copyright and patent law. 30 Because Son), concerned
a new technological development, 31 it is appropriate to examine the con-
cept in both settings.
23. Id. The legislative history of section 107 indicates that Congress endorsed the purposes and
general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66.
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5680. This indicates that analysis should not
be limited to consideration of only the four stated factors.
24. See Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REV. 163, 173-77
(1981).
25. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). affd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
26. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam).
27. The Benny rationale has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Note. Parody and Co-
pyright Infringement, 56 COLtJM. L. REv. 585 (1956); Comment, Parody and the Law of Copyright,
29 FORDHAM L. REV. 570 (1961); Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright Infringe-
ment?. 12 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1959); see also Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc.. 329 F.2d 541.
544-45 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
28. Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978).
29. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978); New York Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39 F.Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
30. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04A (1981); 4 D. CHIsust. PAT-
ENTS §§ 17.01-17.05 (1982).
31. The court in Son faced a copyright question of first impression because there was an issue of
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1. Copyright Contributory Infringement
Copyright contributory infringement requires, first, a direct infringe-
ment of the copyright. 32 Second, it requires that a contributory infringer
know of the infringing activity. 33 Third, the contributory infringer must
then induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringing conduct. 34
The function that the contributory infringer plays in the reproduction pro-
cess is more important than the extent of involvement in determining
whether alleged wrongful conduct has contributed to the primary in-
fringement. 35
Copyright contributory infringement evolved from common law princi-
ples of agency. 36 Consequently, courts focus on the defendant's knowl-
edge of and power to control the directly infringing activity.
The knowledge requirement is met when the defendant is sufficiently
involved with the activity to have actual knowledge of or reason to know
of the infringement. For example, a court found the requisite knowledge
when a concert artists' management agency knew that its artists were per-
forming copyrighted works without securing copyright licenses and yet
helped to organize an artists' association and created an audience for
them. 37 Similarly, a court imposed liability on an advertising agency
whose employee knew that records it advertised were being made without
the makers paying a compulsory license fee. The employee handled not
only the advertising, but also the manufacture and distribution of the rec-
ords. The court found that the agency employee was a "knowing party to
the piracy. His knowledge binds his employer.' '38
In applying the "control and supervision" standard, courts assess the
relationship between the direct infringer and the alleged contributory in-
fringer to decide whether the contributory infringer had the requisite par-
an unauthorized use of a literary or audiovisual copyrighted work coupled with the use of a new
technological device. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 447
(1979).
32. See, e.g., ARO Mfg. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,483 (1964).
33. E.g., id. at 488.
34. See, e.g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
35. E.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968)
("[M]ere quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liabil-
ity. . . . Rather, resolution of the issue . . . depends upon a determination of the function that
[the alleged infringer] plays in the total process of television broadcasting and reception.").
36. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
37. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162-63 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 788, 792
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v.
Metlis and Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ticipation in or control over the infringing activity. The requirement is
met when the party has the right and ability to control the infringing ac-
tivity. Control will not be inferred merely from the existence of a business
or legal relationship. 39
Control was the key element in several cases involving sponsors of
infringing radio or television programs. The courts refused to impose lia-
bility on the sponsors who did not have access to or control over the con-
tent of the programs. 40 But when the sponsor's approval was required at
several stages in the production of the program, courts found liability. 41
One indication of control is the presence of a direct financial benefit
from the copyright infringement. For example, a store owner who col-
lected a percentage of receipts generated by a concessionnaire employee
selling infringing records was liable for contributory infringement.
42
Thus, failure to exercise power to prevent copyright infringement, cou-
pled with direct financial benefit, is a sufficient basis for imposing liabil-
ity for contributory infringement. 43
2. Patent Contributoty Infingement
Patent contributory infringement, in contrast to copyright contributory
infringement, evolved from common law principles of aiding and abet-
ting.4 4 The 1952 Patent Act codified this doctrine by imposing liability on
anyone selling a component of a patented product or process knowing it
to be specially made for infringing uses. 45 Although the precedential
39. See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rer'd on other
grounds. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
40. Id. at 730: National Ass'n of Performing Artists v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co.. 38 F. Supp.
531. 533 (E. D. Pa. 1941): see also Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.. 329 F. Supp. 601
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41. E.g., Davisv. E. I. DuPont deNemours &Co.. 240 F.Supp 612, 631-32(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
42. Shapiro, Bemstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). The court stated
that the right and the ability to supervise the infringing activity, coupled with financial benefit, gave
rise to liability. Id. at 307.
43. See, e.g., id; Davis v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612. 632 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
44. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 17.02. at 17-3 (1982).
45. The Patent Act provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor. infringes
the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composi-
tion, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
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value of patent law for copyright law is in need of further explication, its
underlying rationale is pertinent to the present case.46
A defense to patent contributory infringement is the "staple item of
commerce" theory. 47 This defense relieves a component seller of liability
when the article sold is capable of noninfringing as well as infringing
uses. 48 The suggested noninfringing use must not be "far-fetched," "il-
lusory," impractical, or merely experimental. 49 A seller of a component
capable of noninfringing uses nevertheless may be liable if the seJler takes
further steps to induce infringement through advertising or instruction. 50
II. THE SONY DECISION
The first issue faced by the Ninth Circuit in Sony was whether home
video recording of publicly broadcast movies for private use infringed a
copyright. Because the copyrighted works were reproduced 5' on the Be-
tamax VTR and because the court rejected a fair use defense, 52 the court
found that the defendant had infringed plaintiffs' copyrights directly. The
appellate court rejected an analogy to home sound recordings that the dis-
trict court had found persuasive. 53 The district court found no direct in-
fringement by its analogy 54 because an amendment to the Copyright Act 55
declared that home sound recordings were a noninfringing use.56 The
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
46. Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 461 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976). The district court in Sony relied on this theory. 480 F. Supp.
at 461.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976).
49. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS 17.03(3), at 17-41 to-42. See also Fromberg, Inc. v. Thomhill, 315
F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1963) (in assessing whether a product is a staple article of commerce, the
standard, though ambiguous, is not "mere theoretical capability"); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 457 F. Supp. 482, 509 (N.D. Ind. 1978), rev.'don other grounds, 609 F.2d 1218
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 989 (1981) ("In assessing whether a product is a staple article
of commerce, the quality, quantity, and efficiency of the suggested alternate uses are to be consid-
ered.").
50. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 17.04(3), at 17-48 (1982). It has been suggested that in such cases
the appropriate remedy would not be to forbid the sale, but an injunction against continuing actively
to induce infringement. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 703
n.24, (5th Cir. 1979), aff d, 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
51. The Copyright Act gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce the copy-
righted work, subject to certain exceptions. 17 U.S.C. 88 106, 67-118 (1976). Hence, simply repro-
ducing the copyrighted works constitutes direct infringement.
52. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text infra.
53. 659 F.2d at 966.
54. 480 F. Supp. at 443-46.
55. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (codified as
amended 17 U.S.C. § 114 (Supp. 111978)).
56. The 1971 Sound Recording Amendment carried an expiration date of December 31, 1974, on
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analogy was warranted, the district court asserted, because the underlying
purposes and legislative history of the Act were broad enough to cover
this form of new technology. 57
Rejecting the analogy to home sound recordings, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Act's grant of exclusive rights to owners of copyrighted
movies was limited only by express statutory exceptions. 58 The court
noted that the Act treats sound recording and audiovisual works as sepa-
rate categories in some sections. 59 The court also stated that the legisla-
tive history did not support the analogy because Congress was not con-
cerned with the later VTR technology when it granted limited protection
to sound recording. 60
After finding direct infringement, the court had to decide whether the
actions were privileged under the doctrine of fair use. The court con-
cluded that the defense of fair use was precluded because the materials
were reproduced for the work's "ordinary purpose."61
Despite this threshold rejection of the fair use defense, the court exam-
ined each statutory fair use factor. 62 In considering the first factor-the
purpose and character of the use-the court criticized the district court's
reliance on the noncommercial, home use nature of the copying to find a
fair use. The court noted that the statute differentiated only between com-
mercial and nonprofit educational purposes and did not recognize a cate-
gory for noncommercial entertainment use. 63 The court briefly considered
the second factor-the nature of the copyrighted work-and found the
public broadcast character of the copyrighted works irrelevant. 64 The
third factor-the substantiality of the taking-weighed heavily in the
court's view against finding fair use because the entire work had been
copied. 65 The court rejected the notion that the "substantiality" factor
was relevant only when economic harm resulted from the taking. 66 The
the assumption that, by that date, a general revision bill would have been enacted covering the same
material. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1971). Since the general revision bill was
stalled, Congress passed a bill in 1974 which established the 1971 Amendment on a permanent basis
until the passage of the new Act. Act of Dec. 31, 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
See generally Appelees' Brief and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 46 n.34 (describing the history of this
Amendment), Universal City Studios Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am.. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
57. 480 F. Supp. at 443.
58. 659 F.2d at 966.
59. Id. at 967. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(6). 102(a)(7), 108(h), 110(1). 112(a) (1976).
60. 659 F.2d at 968.
61. Id. at 970 (quoting L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978)).
62. Id. at 972-74. See generally text accompanying note 23 supra (reproducing the four statu-
tory fair use factors).
63. 659 F.2d at 972: see 17 U.S.C. § 107(a)(1976).
64. 659 F.2d at 972.
65. Id. at 972-73.
66. ld. at 973-74.
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Vol. 57:599, 1982
Copyright Infringement and VTR's
court declined to address the fourth factor-the effect of the use upon the
copyrighted work-on the issue of liability. Nonetheless, the court ob-
served the difficulty in establishing harm, and presumed that the potential
market for the plaintiffs' work was diminished. 67
The last issue the court faced, once it found direct infringement, was
contributory infringement. Rejecting the "staple item of commerce" de-
fense, the court found the corporate defendants liable because they both
knew that Betamax brand VTR's would be used to reproduce copyrighted
materials and because they either induced, caused, or materially contribu-
ted to the infringing conduct of Betamax users. 68 The court did not state
the basis for its conclusion that the requirement of inducement, causation,
or contribution was fulfilled. Apparently, the court held the defendants
accountable because they manufactured, distributed, advertised, and pro-
fited from the sale of Betamax recorders. 69
III. ANALYSIS
A. Direct User Infringement
The court in Sony first found that home Betamax users infringed the
plantiffs' copyrights. It based its decision on a literal reading of the Copy-
right Act. This literal reading was inappropriate because the VTR repre-
sented a unique technological advancement. When technological change
renders the language of the Copyright Act ambiguous, the courts should
construe the Act in light of its basic purpose. 70 The court's task should be
to balance competing interests to promote the purpose of the Copyright
Act. These competing interests include the copyright owner's interest in
retaining control and the user's and the public's interest in broad dissemi-
nation of information and technology. It is appropriate for the court to
resort to legislative history to predict congressional preference in striking
the balance. 71
67. Id. at 974.
68. Id. at 975-76.
69. Id. at 976. The court also ordered reconsideration by the district court of the plaintiffs' claims
of unfair competition and the opportunity for the defendants to establish the three affirmative defenses
of (1) laches and estoppel, (2) copyright invalidity, or (3) unclean hands/copyright enforceability.
The Ninth Circuit did not alter the decision of the district court in finding no infringement for the
retail store use. The court also left remedies to the district court. Id. at 976-77.
70. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974).
71. "When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use however clear the words may appear on 'super-
ficial examination.' " Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534,543-44 (1940)).
In Sony, the district court reviewed House reports, committee hearings, floor debates, and reports
from the Office of Copyrights. 480 F. Supp. at 445.
607
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The legislative history concerned home-use sound recordings, which
Congress exempted from infringement liability72 because of their non-
commercial nature. 73 The Ninth Circuit discounted this legislative history
because it concerned sound, not audio-visual, recording. This distinction
is unwarranted. In 1971, when the Sound Recording Amendment to the
Copyright Act was passed, Congress could not foresee the potential for
home VTR's. 74 Nevertheless. sound recording is analogous to video re-
cording in several ways. Both involve recording a public broadcast re-
ceived through another medium for home use. Both present the same in-
soluble direct enforcement problems. The only distinction is that one
includes a picture in addition to sound. That is a distinction without a
difference. Congressional intent not to restrain home-use recording of
broadcast programs when the recording is for private, noncommercial use
is equally applicable to home video recording and to sound recording.
B. Fair Use
If a court finds direct infringement, the doctrine of fair use becomes
relevant to determine whether the activities are nevertheless privileged.
The Sony court rejected fair use analysis as inapplicable when a work is
completely reproduced for its ordinary or "intrinsic" purpose. 75 The
court cited no case authority for the preliminary rejection of the applica-
tion of fair use. This notion is incorrect for two reasons. First, it ignores
the mandate of the Copyright Act that, notwithstanding the provisions
defining the copyright holder's rights, "the factors to be considered [in
determining a fair use] shall include . . . " the four factors of section
72. 1971 Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140. § l(a). 85 Stat. 391 (codified as
amended 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
73. See H. R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong.. 1st Sess. 1, 7 (1971). reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.
74. The revision of the 1909 Copyright Act began in 1955. Progress in revision was very slow,
however, and by 1971. the problem of record piracy had become severe. Rather than waiting for
complete revision. Congress passed the Sound Recordings Act to deal with sound recording piracy.
When it granted copyright protection to sound recording, Congress stated: "This practice [home
sound recording] is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers would
be in no different position from that of the owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions over
the past 20 years." Id.: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am.. 480 F. Supp. 429.
443-44 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Betamax was introduced in the United States in the latter part of 1975.
Appellees' Brief and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 9, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, legislators in 1971 could not see the potential of VTR's to
become as common and widespread as sound recording.
75. 659 F.2d at 970. But see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.
1973) (holding that a fair use may exist if entire medical and scientific articles published in public
journals are copied) aff dby an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
Vol. 57:599. 1982
Copyright Infringement and VTR's
107.76 The statute thus does not allow a preliminary rejection of fair use
based on the ordinary or "intrinsic" purpose of the copying. The Act
clearly mandates full judicial consideration of the four factors notwith-
standing any rights established in section 106. 77
Second, the doctrine's equitable operation makes it a suitable tool to
decide rights and liabilities in the context of technological progress and
resulting economic change. The doctrine permits a court to balance the
interests in economic protection against the countervailing interests in
public dissemination of scientific progress and artistic information. 78
Despite its threshold rejection of the fair use defense, the Sony court
proceeded to analyze the four statutory factors in the defense. The court
first considered "the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses," 79 and criticized the district court's emphasis of the noncommer-
cial nature of home video recording. It noted that the statute does not
draw a "simple noncommercial/commercial distinction." ' 80 This is cor-
rect, but neither does the statute ignore the distinction. Congress consid-
ered general noncommerciality as an important factor in enacting the
sound recording exemption. 81
In addition, the plain language of the Act mandates consideration of the
commercial or noncommercial nature of a use. The Act provides that a
commercial purpose or a nonprofit educational purpose are subsidiary
factors to be "included" 8 2 in the broad consideration of the purpose and
character of the use. The "including" language suggests that Congress
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 23 supra (reproduc-
ing the four statutory factors).
77. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that a court must
evaluate the four factors in concert in determining the applicability of fair use doctrine, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978); New York Tribune, Inc., v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(stating that if and when fair use constitutes a defense is to be determined by consideration of all
elements).
78. Congress codified the judicial doctrine of fair use in section 107. Legislative history indicates
that Congress recognized that the doctrine must be flexible to deal with technological change and
must continue to be an equitable tool for balancing the competing claims in copyright cases:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is
no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technologi-
cal change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-
case basis.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. COoE CONG. & AD. NEws
5659, 5680; See also S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong, 1 st Sess. 62 (1975).
79. 659 F.2d at 963.
80. Id. at 972.
81. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 445-46 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (discussing legislative history on noncommerciability), and notes 54-56 supra.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1976).
609
Washington Law Review
was not interested in only the two purposes. Congress surely did not in-
tend to limit noncommercial fair uses to nonprofit educational uses. Even
the Ninth Circuit in Sony stated that the purposes listed in section 107 are
simply illustrative and not limiting. 83
The noncommercial nature of home video recording is an important
element in the balancing of the equities needed to determine whether the
use is fair. Certainly, home recording for personal use of programs broad-
cast for the free consumption of millions poses a different economic situa-
tion than commercial pirating of such materials for rebroadcast or sale.
Inasmuch as the protections afforded by the Act are given only to protect
the economic incentive to individual productivity ,84 an analysis of the na-
ture of the perceived economic threats posed by home VTR's to that pro-
ductivity is crucial. The court should have entertained such an inquiry in
its analysis of the first factor.
The court, in analyzing the second factor-the nature of the copy-
righted work-rejected the district court's emphasis on the public broad-
cast character of the copyrighted work. 85 The court again should have
made a more detailed inquiry into the effect that plaintiffs' free public
broadcasting of their works had on the equities of the case.
This public broadcast factor is important in the television industry be-
cause the copyright holder of a broadcast program does not receive com-
pensation directly from the ultimate consumer, the viewer. This is unlike
a book, motion picture, or concert, for which the consumer pays directly.
In television, the copyright holder is paid by advertisers based upon the
drawing power of its free broadcast. Because home VTR's do not reduce
the viewing audience for broadcast works, 86 the copyright holders do not
suffer discernible economic loss from home recording. 87 Thus, the public
broadcast nature of the work should weigh heavily in determining
whether curtailment of recording is necessary to protect the plaintiffs'
continued creative initiative.
In contrast, the court emphasized the third factor-the substantiality of
the taking. 88 The fact that the plaintiffs' entire works were recorded
83. 659F.2dat970.
84. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
85. 659 F.2d at 972.
86. The use of the Betamax conceivably increases the viewing audience and thereby the value of
the copyrighted work by permitting viewing by those who, at the time of the broadcast, were not at
home or elected to watch a different broadcast. Potential increase in value would depend on the
advertisers' perception of the greater number of people viewing the commercials with the recorded
materials.
87. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 450 F.Supp. 429, 439 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
("[Pilaintiffs conceded that neither the sale nor the use of Betamax and Betamax tapes had by the
time of trial caused [them] any measurable monetary damage, economic loss or revenue loss. ")
88. 659F.2dat973.
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weighed heavily against finding fair use. In typical copyright cases, the
more extensive the reproduction, the less likely a court is to find a fair
use. 89 This principle has arisen, however, from cases involving reproduc-
tion followed by publication and distribution. 90 In that setting, the sub-
stantiality of the taking is directly proportional to the harm suffered by the
copyright holder. 91 In home video recording, the amount taken bears little
relationship to the harm, if any, to the rights of the copyright holders
because they did not look to the viewer for payment. On the contrary, the
more that is taken and watched, the larger the audience drawn and the
larger the fees from advertising.
The court stated that it was unnecessary to inquire into the fourth fac-
tor-the effect of home VTR use on the potential market for, or the value
of, the copyrighted work. 92 In declining consideration of this factor,
which weighs heavily in favor of fair use, the court left a gap in its analy-
sis. Its failure to inquire into economic harm contravenes the statutory
directive that the four enumerated factors shall all be considered in deter-
mining whether a use is fair. 93
Without providing an alternative analysis of the fourth factor, the court
rejected the district court's approach. The court stated that the district
court "was much too strict in requiring appellants to establish its degree
of harm." 94 It noted that it is extremely difficult for a copyright plaintiff
to prove that harm resulted from the defendant's activities. 95 Plaintiffs
conceded, however, that neither the sale nor the use of Betamax had
caused any measurable economic loss 96 and that no existing control, li-
cense, or advantageous business relationship had been injured by the sale
or use of the Betamax. 97 These concessions severely undermine the
court's criticisms.
The district court found no potential future harm to the plaintiffs' mar-
89. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal.
1979). See, e.g., Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 183
(S.D. Cal. 1955), affld sub noma. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff d per
curiam by an equally divided court sub noa. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S.
43 (1958).
90. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 455-56 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
91. Id. at 454.
92. 659 F.2d at 973.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977). See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
94. 659 F.2d at 973.
95. Id. at 974.
96. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of -Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 439 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
97. Id.
Washington Law Review
ket. 98 Despite this finding, the Ninth Circuit asserted that "it seems
clear" that the activity in question would diminish this potential mar-
ket. 99 The facts suggest otherwise. As noted above, the copyright holder
of television programs is not directly compensated by the viewer because
programs are broadcast free of charge. The advertisers' payments, based
on the size of the audience, dictate the copyright holder's profit. This
makes the relevant marketplace the negotiating table between the poten-
tial broadcasters and advertisers. So far, the impact of the Betamax on the
size of the television audience apparently has not arisen during negotia-
tions between copyright holders and the broadcasters. 100
Further, home VTR's increase the audience size by allowing users to
record programs for later viewing that they otherwise might miss. 10 1 The
value of the plaintiffs' works should be enhanced because the viewing
audience is increased and therefore expected payments from advertisers
should increase. 102
C. Contributoty Infringement
The most significant holding of the Sony case was that the manufac-
turer, distributor, and seller of the Betamax VTR were contributorily li-
able. As a practical matter, liability of corporate defendants is more likely
to affect the development of VTR technology than is liability of home
users. The plaintiffs directed their plea for relief at the corporate defen-
dants, not the private home user. 103 This choice reflects the plaintiffs'
recognition that enforcing a prohibition on home VTR's would be highly
intrusive and practically impossible.
Despite the significance of this issue, the Ninth Circuit summarily re-
versed the district court's decision and held that the corporate appellees
were liable. 104 The court's most critical analytical error was in rejecting
98. Id. at464,468.
99. 659 F.2d at 974.
100. Appellees' Brief and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 25 n.26, Universal City Studios. Inc. v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
101. This phenomenon is known as "time-shifting." Id. at 24.
102. The frequency with which television broadcasts are videotaped can be taken into account in
the television rating. Presently, the frequency with which people videotape is not taken into account
in the ratings because of its insignificant impact. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am..
480 F. Supp. 429, 441 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Advertisers use the ratings to judge the value of the time
bought.
103. Only one owner of a Betamax VTR was made a defendant in Sony, and he was given a
complete hold-harmless agreement by the plaintiffs, Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney
Productions, before the action was filed. He never appeared in the action and never had counsel.
Appellees' Brief and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 4, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
104. 659 F.2d at 974.
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the "staple item of commerce" theory. This theory is borrowed from
closely analogous patent law cases in which a seller of an item is held
liable because the item sold is used in a process or mechanism that in-
fringes a patent. 105 The theory relieves the seller of liability if the compo-
nent is capable of noninfringing as well as infringing uses. ' 06 In the pre-
sent case, plaintiffs sought to impose liability on the sellers of an item-
the Betamax VTR-used in infringing a copyright. No copyright cases
are as closely analogous as those found in patent law. 107
The underlying rationale of the "staple item of commerce" theory is
applicable. The Supreme Court stated this rationale in an early patent
contributory infringement case: "[A] sale of an article which though
adapted to an infringing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is
not enough to make the seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would
block the wheels of commerce." 108 Enforcement of a copyright owner's
claims has the potential to block the development and use of a new tech-
nology: the VTR. Given the competing interests in copyright law between
the owners and the public, the "staple item of commerce" theory is the
appropriate analytical framework because it balances analogous claims-
the patent holder's rights versus the public's interest in commercial ex-
pansion-in patent law.
To decide whether the Betamax is a staple item of commerce, a court
must look closely at the facts.109 In Sony the court did not look at the
facts; it simply stated that video tape recorders are not suitable for non-
infringing uses. It relied not on the record but on a legal treatise, 110 which
is questionable authority for a factual determination in a case involving a
new technology. VTR's may be used for noninfringing purposes, con-
trary to the Ninth Circuit's finding. I"' For example, not all television pro-
grams are subject to copyright protection. Such nonprotected programs
include those on which the copyright has expired, those that cannot be
copyrighted, 112 those that could be registered for copyright but are not,
105. See 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTs § 17.03, at 17-35 (1982) (discussion of the patent law cases).
See generally part IB supra (discussing contributory infringement).
106. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 17.03, at 17-34 (1982).
107. As the district court noted, the problem is that the precedential value of patent law for
copyright law is uncertain. 480 F. Supp at 461. Because of the similarity of the cases, however, this
Note suggests that the patent cases are more useful.
108. Henryv. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1,48(1912).
109. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 17.03(3), at 17-41 (1982) (analogous patent cases involving the
staple article of commerce theory).
110. 659 F.2d at 975 (citing 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 12.04[A], at 12-39-40).
More appropriately, the court should have conducted an inquiry into the particular facts of this case,
evaluating all potential uses of the VTR.
111. 659F.2dat975.
112. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 411 (1976). These sections require that the program must be regis-
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and those registered for copyright by owners who do not object to home
use recording. 113 Because the Betamax could be used in noninfringing
ways, it can be found to be a staple item of commerce. The court should
have examined closely these possible noninfringing uses, rather than hold
as a matter of law that the Betamax defendants could not establish a "sta-
ple item of commerce" defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sony decision imposed ultimate economic responsibility for home
use video recording on the corporate defendants who produce and distri-
bute the technology. The decision protects copyright proprietors from the
questionable harms of home VTR's at the price of restricting low-cost
dissemination of this new technology.
Sony involved a conflict of legitimate interests. A detailed inquiry into
the purposes of the copyright laws was therefore appropriate. The Ninth
Circuit failed to undertake this inquiry in Sony. An examination of the
legislative history behind the development of the statutory fair use ex-
emption for the analogous sound recording technology demonstrates that
home video recording should not constitute direct infringement. Simi-
larly, appropriate application of the fair use doctrine would have led the
court to recognize home video recording as a fair use. Finally, the court
should have perceived the potential for restricting new technology, and
applied the "staple item of commerce" defense of patent law.
tered and deposited before bringing an action for infringement under the new Act. If the program-
ming is taped but soon erased, deposit and registration is impossible.
113. It is significant that programming is available for home use Betamax recording with the
owner's consent. This is one whole area of material that would be a permissible noninfringing use.
Exactly how many programs presently shown on television can be recorded with the owner's blessing
is undocumented. But representatives from Major League Baseball, the National Football League,
the National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, and the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association each testified that their organizations had no objection to home use videotape re-
cordings of their copyrighted broadcasts. Appellees' Brief and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 12, Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, some religious
organizations and a significant number of owners of educational programmers testified that they had
no objection to home use videotape recording of their copyrighted broadcasts. Id. Permissible record-
ing also includes entertainment programs to which the copyright has expired. Id. at 14. These areas of
permissible noninfringing home use recording should not go uncounted when deciding whether the
Betamax is a staple article of commerce capable of noninfringing use.
An action for infringement cannot be brought under the Copyright Act without prior registration
and deposit of the tape. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 411 (1976). Surveys sponsored by the Sony Corporation
of America showed that substantial local programming, including news, documentaries, and public
events, is not copyrighted because it is soon erased, making deposit and registration impossible.
Appellees' Brief and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 14, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, another area of programming capable of noninfringing
Betamax VTR recording is represented.
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The Sony court's rigid analysis failed to balance the competing claims
of copyright holders and producers of a new technology. Consequently,
certiorari was appropriately granted by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 114
Debra A. Sitzberger
114. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No. 81-1687).
